The Traitors of Arnhem - Martin Bormann and the Bilderberg Group

The Traitors Of Arnhem? Martin Bormann & the Bilderberg Group ISBN 0 9328070 7 6.
100 pagesCondition is New. Dispatched with Royal Mail 2nd Class.

By Tony Gosling (April 2021)
Sept 1944 'Bridge Too Far' Arnhem battle and bringing of Hitler's treasurer Martin Bormann to England in May 1945 at the end of WWII
Key pro-Nazis in 1930s England were Edward VIII and Bank of England governor Montague Norman.Field Marshal Montgomery's concept behind MARKET-GARDEN was a sound one, to obtain a bridgehead over the Lower Rhine would have seeded panic in German defences and supply lines, and by directly threatening Germany's industrial heartland, likely brought the war to a speedy conclusion.
However, several enormous operational errors, which in light of more recent events may be considered sabotage, diverted field officers and the overall operation from the original plan.
The Traitors Of Arnhem takes the reader through the solid evidence that the Battle of Arnhem, Operation Market Garden, was 'thrown', deliberately, by senior British commanders, in order to buy the Nazis time to complete financial deals with the Allies that had been in train at least since a secret meeting, revealed here, since the previous month. On the military, political and financial trail we follow the cover-up of the subsequent snatching by Royal Navy commandos in the last days of the war, of British agent and Adolf Hitler's private secretary Martin Bormann, Alongside other Allied/Nazi deals too, such as the smuggling by submarine of enriched Uranium from the Nazi stores to be incorporated into the Manhattan Project, evidence of which has only emerged in the final decade of the twentieth century.
The culprits are identified for eleven operational 'mistakes', all of which decreased Market Garden's chances of succeeding. Nevertheless, due to the ferocious courage of PIR 504 of the US 82nd Airborne division the operation nearly succeeded and had to be very obviously, deliberately scuppered in what must be one of the most treacherous decisions in military history.- Only one drop was attempted per day, two were requested by Brereton to make best use of good weather [Williams]
- Paratroopers were dropped many miles from their objectives, forsaking the vital element of surprise [Monty and Browning]
- Photo-reconnaissance and Dutch underground reports of SS panzers lurking within easy reach of Arnhem was ignored [Monty and Browning]
- 1st Airborne's radios didn't work properly due to jamming, or faulty crystals
- Failure of senior field officer to drop with main objective division [Browning]
- 82nd Airborne was diverted from Nijmegen bridges to Groesbeek [Browning]
- Gavin's Mon 18th Nijmegen Bridge night assault was called off [Browning]
- Failure to drop supplies of water, food, ammunition etc to Oosterbeek or Arnhem despite regular 1st Airborne situation reports received [Browning]
- Refusal of air-landing reinforcements: 52nd Lowland Division and 6th Airborne Division entrained in UK and ready to drop in [Browning]
- Failure to mobilise Grenadier or Irish Guards tanks or 130th Brigade of the 43rd Infantry Division for final drive to Arnhem [Horrocks]
- Polish brigade wasted. Could have been dropped just South of Arnhem bridge etc. but were not sent in until after bridge had fallen to the enemy [Browning]
This seemingly unstoppable thirst for war rather betrays the pre-war concept of covert support for Nazi Germany as a buffer against Soviet communism from Wall Street and City of London fascists.